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Therefore, the Eason decision may only introduce unnecessary
confusion into an already confused area of the law. In spite of the fact
that the Birnbaum doctrine was rejected, the analysis used by the
court after the rejection was very similar to that required under the
Birnbaum rule. The decision may also allow courts to ignore the
balancing required between the needs for a vigorous securities market
and for the protection of investors.7 4 In light of the Supreme Court's
practice of deferring decisions on matters of securities regulation to
the legislative branch,75 the conflict between Eason and cases adher-
ing to the purchaser-seller requirement may not be resolved until
Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission takes steps to
clarify the private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.6
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH HABENICHT
BARGAINING LOCKOUTS AND THE USE OF
TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS: A LEGITIMATE
EMPLOYER OPTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is premised upon the
theory that encouragement of the process of collective bargaining will
mitigate and eliminate impediments to the "free flow of commerce."'
When either the union or management acts in a manner which
threatens this statutory labor policy, the National Labor Relations
Board is "empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
4See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
"See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1962).
76One commentator has noted that the SEC is better equipped to define the right
to due under § 10(b) than are the courts. He asks: "After nearly thirty years of experi-
ence with Rule 10b(5) and nearly twenty-five with the private action, has nothing been
learned which could usefully be incorporated into an amended or restated rule? Or is
the prose of 1942 timeless in its clarity and its verity?" Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The
Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 222 (1970).
Another article suggests that "Congress or the S.E.C. should bring some sembl-
ance of order by means of workable rules or regulations in this field so that the corpora-
tions and their stockholders may not be subjected to countless law suits at the whim
or every purchaser, seller, or potential purchaser who may claim he would have acted
or refrained from acting." Comment, Securities-Standing Under Rule lOb-
5-Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971),
60 GEo. L.J. 1605 (1972).
129 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
any unfair labor practice . . affecting commerce." 2 One employer
practice which, until recently, had been universally considered to be
contrary to collective bargaining was the so-called "bargaining lock-
out." This particular type of lockout has been defined as "a shutdown
initiated by an employer in order to break a bargaining impasse in
circumstances where, apart from the lockout, the employer's conduct
is blameless."' The Board has held that such conduct interferes with
the employees' rights as protected under § 7 of the NLRA.4 However,
other Board decisions have recognized that, in certain situations, the
employer may resort to a lockout as a defense to a threatened union
strike.5 When using a defensive lockout, the employer has also been
permitted to hire temporary replacements to continue his business
operations until a settlement has been reached.' The bargaining lock-
out, on the other hand, has been categorized as "offensive" in nature
and the use of temporary personnel subsequent to a bargaining lock-
229 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). Section 8 of the NLRA lists a number of practices for
which either the union or the company will be charged with an unfair labor practice.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158 et seq. (1970).
3See Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows On An Old Terrain, 28
U. CH. L. REv. 614 (1961). Professor Meltzer notes that the Board has generally found
the bargaining lockout to be violative of the provisions of the NLRA. See, e.g., Morand
Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), remanded sub nom. Morand Bros. Bever-
age Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
909 (1953). See also Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947).
In contrast to the bargaining lockout, the Board and the courts have upheld the
use of lockouts by the employer to prevent unique economic losses or to preserve the
effectiveness of a multi-employer bargaining association. These types of lockouts have
been defined as "defensive" and were distinguished from the offensive bargaining
lockout. See text accompanying notes 20-45 infra.
'American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820 (1956), enf. denied, 244 F.2d 489 (7th
Cir. 1957). Section 7 of the NLRA provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment. ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). To safeguard against any infringement of these rights,
§ 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 .... " 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
5See, e.g., Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), aff'd sub nom.
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
INLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1962). See text accompanying note 34 infra.
1974]
774 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
out has been the subject of conflicting decisions.
7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Inland Trucking
Co. v. NLRB, and the Eighth Circuit in Inter-Collegiate Press v.
NLRB, were recently presented with the question of whether an
employer may lawfully lock-out his employees after a bargaining
impasse has occurred'0 and subsequently hire temporary help until an
agreement is reached. The Seventh Circuit found that an offensive
lockout "accompanied by continued operation with replacement
labor, is per se . . . an unfair labor practice under § 158(a)(1)
[§ 8(a)(1)]."" Since the employer's actions were deemed in conflict
with § 8(a)(1), the court also held that the use of temporary person-
nel following a bargaining lockout was violative of § 8(a)(3).11
'The Board has recently recognized that a bargaining lockout followed by the use
of temporary replacements may be a lawful bargaining tactic. Ii Ottawa Silica Co.,
Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1972), the Board held that the use of a
bargaining lockout and temporary replacements was a logical extension of the Supreme
Court's decisions in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1964), and American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). 80 L.R.R.M. at 1406. See notes 34-44 and accompa-
nying text infra. However, the decision in Ottawa Silica points out the split of author-
ity regarding the use of this type of lockout since two members of the Board were in
the majority, one member specially concurred and two members dissented. Chairman
Miller concurred in the result reached by the majority, but only because:
(1) Respondent [employer] utilized only its own nonunit personnel
in carrying out its operations during the lockout, (2) the Union had
refused to provide any assurance of continued operations, and there
was therefore reason to believe that a strike was imminent, and (3)
there was here some evidence, although perhaps not totally conclusive
evidence, of a bona fide business justification for Respondent's ac-
tions.
80 L.R.R.M. at 1409. In their dissent, Members Fanning and Jenkins adhered to the
principles set forth in Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971),
where the court found the bargaining lockout and the use of temporary replacements
to be violative of both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3). 80 L.R.R.M. at 1408-09. See note 8 and
accompanying text infra. The Board's decision was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in
Ottawa Silica Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973).
9440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971). The court upheld the decision of the Board. See
Inland Trucking Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 350 (1969). However, contrary to the Seventh
Circuit's opinion, the Board stated that "the legality of the [employers] actions...
(or their illegality) cannot be determined simply as a matter of law, per se, wholly
apart from the context in which such conduct occurred." Id. at 356.
9486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973).
"An impasse has been defined as a situation where the parties, bargaining in good
faith, are deadlocked. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
11440 F.2d at 565. See note 4 supra.
1440 F.2d at 565. Section 8(a)(3) states in part that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encouage or discouarge membership in any labor
organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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Section 8(a)(1) involves a balancing of the employer's economic
interests with the § 7 rights of the employees. 3 However, in order to
find a violation of § 8(a)(3), the employer must discriminate against
his employees "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment" with the intent to "encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization."" Under the analysis
used by the Seventh Circuit in Inland Trucking, the bargaining lock-
out and the use of temporary personnel was so inimical to the employ-
ees' rights under § 7 that it could not be justified in terms of the
employer's economic interests.'5 The employer's actions, standing
alone, were also held sufficient to show both discrimination against
the permanent employees and an anti-union motivation. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit found that the company had committed an unfair
labor practice under § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3).'8
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit in Inter-
Collegiate specifically rejected the idea that a bargaining lockout
followed by the use of temporary replacements was a per se violation
of § 8(a)(1). Instead, the court held that the employer's conduct did
not jeopardize the union's ability to actively represent its members
and had only a slight effect upon the employees' § 7 rights." Empha-
sizing the fact that a per se rule would interfere with the Board's
discretion in such matters, the court ruled that the most desirable
approach would be to allow the Board to consider each case on its
merits.' In evaluating violations of both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3), the
case-by-case analysis would involve a weighing of the impact of the
'"The Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263 (1965), stated that in order to find a violation of § 8(a)(1) the trier must decide
that "the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the
employer's action . . . ... Id. at 269.
"29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See note 12 supra.
'1440 F.2d at 565.
"Id.
11486 F.2d at 841, 845. The circuit court enforced the Board's decision. See Inter-
Collegiate Press, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 35,81 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1972). However, as in Ottawa
Silica, note 7 supra, the members of the Board were evenly divided on the issue. The
majority held that absent a showing of unlawful intent the hiring of temporary replace-
ments following a bargaining lockout did not violate §§ 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3). 81 L.R.R.M.
at 1510. Two members of the Board dissented, holding that the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Inland T rucking should be controlling. Id. at 1512. Chairman Miller dis-
sented from both views and found that the correct approach should be to balance the
legitimacy of the employer's actions against the effect that those actions have upon
the employees' rights. Id. at 1510-11. Thus, under the facts of the case, Chairman
Miller found that the bargaining lockout and the use of temporary employees was not
violative of § 8(a)(1) or § 8(a)(3). Id. at 1512.
"1486 F.2d at 840-41.
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lockout upon the employees' protected rights against the business
reasons that the company must show to justify its actions. A per se
rule, as adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Inland Trucking, would
appear to obviate a balancing of the competing interests of the com-
pany and its employees. However, prior to a determination of the
legitimacy of the use of temporary employees, the initial question of
the legality of the bargaining lockout should be analyzed. The bar-
gaining lockout must be defined within the context of the various
economic weapons to which an employer may resort after negotia-
tions with the union have broken down.
Lockouts 9 may be classified into three different categories: (1) the
economic lockout to which the employer resorts to save himself from
unique business losses due to a threatened union strike; 20 (2) a lockout
by the members of a multi-employer bargaining association which is
designed to counter a "whipsaw" strike by the union;2' and (3) a
'"The lockout has been defined as the "temporary withholding of employment in
order to serve some interest of the employer vis-a-vis his employees .. " Oberer,
Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51
CORNELL L.Q. 193, 194 (1966). The Wagner Act of 1935 made no reference to the term
"lockout." However, lockouts are referred to under the Taft-Hartley Amendments, but
the legality of this type of work stoppage is neither specifically denied or upheld. See
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 173, 176, 178(a)
(1970). It is submitted that, by implication, the use of the term under the federal labor
laws would negate any inference that the lockout is per se an unlawful tactic. For
example, 8(d) states in part:
[W]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract . . . the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party
desiring such termination or modification . . . (4) continues in full
force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms
and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d). This conclusion is further supported by the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). See notes 29-34 and
accompanying text infra. During the course of the opinion, the Court pointed out that
"[t]he unqualified use of the term 'lock-out' in several sections of the Taft-Hartley
Act is statutory recognition that there are circumstances in which employers may
lawfully resort to the lockout as an economic weapon." 353 U.S. at 92-93.
2E.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 767 (1953);
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
907 (1951); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943); Brown-McLaren Mfg.
Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941); Lengel-Fencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938). See also
Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
24 U. CHI. L. REV. 70 (1956).
21E.g., Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), enf. sub nom., NLRB
v. Truck Driver's Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). A whipsaw strike is "the process of
striking one at a time the employer members of a multi-employer association." 353
U.S. at 90 n.7. The purpose of "whipsawing" is to bring economic pressure to bear on
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bargaining lockout which is used to bring economic pressure to bear
upon the union during the course of collective bargaining negotia-
tions. 2 The economic lockout was the earliest form of "employment
withholding" to be recognized as a legitimate defensive measure. In
Duluth Bottling Association,2 the employer was charged with a viola-
tion of § 8(3) of the Wagner Act4 following a lockout of the company
employees. The Board found that the employer was "motivated en-
tirely by a desire to avoid the peculiar economic loss which would
have been a fortuitous incident of the strike, [and] that the lockout
was intended merely to synchronize with, and not precipitate, eco-
nomic conflict." " In the opinion of the Board, a lockout under these
circumstances was a proper defensive measure which was intended
to protect the property of the employer.2
Utilizing the distinction between a "defensive" and an "offen-
sive" 21 lockout, the Board, in Buffalo Linen Supply Co.,2 9 held that
company members of a multi-employer bargaining association were
justified in locking out their employees after the threat of a strike
became imminent. The Trial Examiner found no evidence to uphold
the retaliatory conduct of the association members, but the Board
reversed his decision, and stated: "[A]lthough not specifically an-
nounced by the Union, the strike against the one employer necessar-
ily carried with it an implicit threat of future strike action against any
or all of the other members of the Association."" The threat of the
"whipsaw" strike appeared to provide the impetus for the lockout,"
and the Board held that the members of the association acted in a.
the employers in order to reach an agreement with each one separately. See Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. National Ry. Labor Conf., 310 F. Supp. 905, 910 n.5
(D.D.C. 1970).
12E.g., Darling and Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), aff'd sub nom., Lane v. NLRB,
418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Delhi-Taylor Ref. Div., Hess Oil and Chem. Co., 167
N.L.R.B. 115 (1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1969); American Ship Bldg. Co., 142
N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963), enforced, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 300
(1965).
-48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
249 Stat. 449 (1935). See note 19 supra.
2'48 N.L.R.B. at 1336.
2Id.
'A lockout by the members of a multi-employer association after a whipsaw strike
or a lockout necessitated by the employer's economic position have been defined as
defensive lockouts. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
"Bargaining lockouts have been generally defined as offensive in nature. See note
22 and accompanying text supra.
"109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
"Id. at 448.
"See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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legitimate defensive manner. On review, the Supreme Court upheld
the Board's decision.32 The Court stated that when the employers'
economic interests clashed with the employees' and the union's
rights, "[tihe ultimate problem [was] the balancing of the conflic-
ting legitimate interests. '3  Thus, the Court held that the lockout had
an insubstantial effect upon the union's status as a bargaining agent




The validity of balancing the conflicting interests of the union and
management was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Brown:35
In the absence of proof of unlawful motivation, there are many
economic weapons which an employer may use that either in-
terfere in some measure with concerted employee activities, or
which . . . discourage union membership, and yet the use of
such economic weapons does not constitute conduct that is
within the prohibition of either §8(a)(1) or §8(a)(3).
However, Brown differed in one important aspect from the previous
decisions involving multi-employer lockouts. The employers in
Brown also hired temporary replacements to fill the positions of the
locked-out employeesY.3 The Court acknowledged that the use of tem-
porary personnel had a discriminatory effect upon the regular em-
ployees, but noted that the impact was comparatively slight and the
employers were pursuing a legitimate business end .3 Although Brown
3NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
-'Id. at 96.
"Id. at 97. There was no evidence of economic justification for the lockout. Instead,
the Supreme Court relied on the fact that the employer's actions were prompted by
the union's threat to the multi-employer association. The Court found that Congress
had recognized that in many industries, the "multi-employer bargaining basis was a
vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace through
strengthened collective bargaining." Id. at 95.
3380 U.S. 278 (1965).
"Id. at 283.
-id. The Board had found that the initial lockout was legal, but the hiring of
temporary replacements was contrary to federal labor policy:
In the instant case ... there was no shutdown to protect a bargaining
unit .... [W]hatever defensive validity there may be for shutting
down in the whipsaw context, such consideration is inapposite where,
as here, the employers do not shut down.
137 N.L.R.B. 73, 75 (1963). Thus, in the Board's opinion, the use of temporary person-
nel had a drastic effect upon the employees' § 7 rights. Id. at 75.
21380 U.S. at 287-88. Since the replacements were employed only for the length of
the dispute and the employees could end the lockout by agreeing to the employer's
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appeared to settle the question of the legality of hiring temporary
replacements during a lockout, the Supreme Court expressly ac-
knowledged that the employers' actions were "part and parcel of
[employers'] defensive measure to preserve the multi-employer
group in the face of the strike."39 Thus, in cases such as Brown,
involving the use of temporary replacements, the Supreme Court
maintained the differentiation between offensive and defensive lock-
outs.
Without reaching the question of the legality of using temporary
personnel under this type of lockout," the Court in American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB4 ' held that the employer's resort to a bargain-
ing lockout violated neither § 8(a) (1) nor § 8(a) (3), 2 thereby depart-
ing from the traditional offensive-defensive distinction. 3 In the opin-
ion of the Court, the employees' right to bargain collectively and to
strike were not seriously threatened and there was no showing of
unlawful anti-union motivation.44 The Supreme Court found that the
terms, the Supreme Court held that the discrimination was "comparatively remote."
Id. at 288-89. The Court also pointed out that the pre-existing union-ship agreement
had been incorporated into the new bargaining contract. Thus, the union's position as
the employee's bargaining agent was not dangerously threatened. Id. at 289.
2id. at 284 (emphasis added). In NLRB v. Truckdrivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87
(1957), the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of the multi-employer bargaining
association. See note 34 supra. However, the preservation of the association does not
appear to be the compelling reason for the Court's decision in Brown. Rather, the
attempted whipsaw strike by the union made the prospect of a strike against all the
members of the association a very real possibility. 380 U.S. at 284. It appears that the
Court in Brown was not placing the multi-employer association into a special category,
but instead was recognizing the threat posed by the whipsaw strike. Quoting from the
Tenth Circuit's decision, the Court noted that:
If... the struck employer does choose to operate with replacements
and the other employers cannot replace after lockout, the economic
advantage passes to the struck member, the non-struck members are
deterred in exercising the defensive lockout, and the whipsaw strike
... enjoys an almost inespapable prospect of success.
Id. at 285, quoting, NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 1963).
41The Court refused to consider whether an employer could resort to temporary or
permanent replacements following a bargaining lockout.
41380 U.S. 300 (1965). It should be pointed out that American Ship was decided
on the same day as Brown.
2Id. at 318.
The Board had reversed the Trial Examiner's decision and found that there was
no justification for the employer's action since he could not have reasonably antici-
pated a strike by the union. See American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1363
(1963). The Supreme Court did not address the question of justification and stated that
the sole issue should be whether a lockout intended to bring pressure to bear on the
union was a legitimate economic weapon. 380 U.S. at 308.
11Id. at 308-09.
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duty of the Board was to ensure that the individual rights of the
employees were protected, but the NLRA did not allow the Board to
"deny weapons to one party or the other because of its assessment of
that party's bargaining power."45 The Board's finding that the bar-
gaining lockout was in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) was viewed
by the Court as an unwarranted extension of the Board's authority
under the NLRA and could not be upheld. By declaring the bargain-
ing lockout to be a legitimate economic weapon, the Supreme Court
appeared to vitiate the distinction between offensive and defensive
lockouts.
The use of a lockout and temporary replacements seems to be
limited under the previous Board and Supreme Court decisions. If the
employer is able to show that he has a reasonable fear of a strike, a
defensive lockout of the permanent employees will be upheld.46 At the
same time, NLRB v. Brown upholds the use of temporary replace-
ments after a defensive lockout by members of a multi-employer
bargaining association. 7 Moreover, American Ship apparently vali-
dates a resort to a bargaining lockout if there is no proof of anti-union
motivation and the collective bargaining process is not prejudicially
affected." It would seem that the next logical step would be to recog-
nize that an offensive bargaining lockout, having no greater adverse
effect upon the employees' § 7 rights than a defensive lockout, could
be followed by the use of temporary personnel. Such an approach was
taken by the Eighth Circuit in Inter-Collegitate.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, in Inland Trucking Co. v.
NLRB,4" rejected the argument that the Supreme Court's decisions
in American Ship and Brown could be used to uphold the hiring of
temporary employees after a bargaining lockout.50 The court con-
"1Id. at 317. The Court stated that the main purpose of the NLRA was to "protect
employee self-organization and the process of collective bargaining from disruptive
interferences by employers." Id.
"See notes 23-34 and accompanying text supra.
"See text following note 35 supra.
"See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
49440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971). The Inland Trucking decision involved a bargaining
lockout and the use of temporary replacements by three employers, who were found
not to constitute a multi-employer bargaining association. Inland Trucking Co., 179
N.L.R.B. 350, 356 (1969). After the termination of their bargaining agreements with
the union, the employers locked-out all the regular employees and hired temporary
personnel to continue operations. Id. at 351. The Board held that "there [was] no
substantial evidence of any affirmative or overt act on the part of the Union which
impelled [the employers'] conduct." Id. at 358-59. Thus, in the absence of any com-
pelling business reasons for their actions, the employers were found to be in violation
of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).
-440 F.2d at 564.
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ceded that an offensive lockout was a legitimate economic weapon,-'
but when temporary replacements are used to fill the vacancies cre-
ated by the lockout, the employer's actions "[foreclose] the employ-
ees' opportunity to earn without surrendering the corresponding op-
portunity of the employer."5 Under these circumstances, the court
held that the company should not be able to upset the balance of
economic bargaining power by cutting off the employees right to work
while the business continues to function. Following the offensive-
defensive distinction, the Seventh Circuit found that American Ship
and Brown recognized that replacement employees were allowable
only when they were used as a defense to a threatened union strike.53
Therefore, the court held that a bargaining lockout accompanied by
the hiring of temporary employees was a per se violation of § § 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3).4
However, in Inter-Collegiate Press v. NLRB,1 the Eighth Circuit
noted that "a pro forma application of the labels 'offensive' and 'de-
fensive' to a lockout [does not assist] in the analysis required to
determine the legality of the conduct involved."'" It appears that the
court was unwilling to follow the previous decisions which struck
down the employer's use of an offensive lockout." Rather than view-
ing the problem from the offensive-defensive dichotomy, the Eighth
Circuit held that "the legality of an employer's conduct in a lockout
should be determined by principles set out by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc....."58
51d.521d.
0Id. Thus, the court held that where the bargaining lockout is combined with the
use of temporary personnel, the employer's actions are no longer "defensive" and fall
outside the protection afforded by the Supreme Court in Brown.
11Id. at 565. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
5486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 844. (footnote omitted). See also Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 610
(8th Cir. 1970). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that: "Characteriz-
ing a lockout as 'defensive' or 'offensive' is a difficult task at best .... [S]uch
characterization, if it can be made, may be merely superficial." Id. at 615 n.11.
"See note 23-34 and accompanying text supra. See also Quaker State Oil Refining
Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958), where the Board held:
[The [employer] resorted to this action not because of any reasona-
ble fear that the Union would call a sudden strike ... but to force
the Union and the Respondent's employees to accept its proposed
contract ....
Id. at 334-35. Thus, the Board found that the employer was the protagonist and the
offensive lockout violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Id. at 334.
"8486 F.2d at 844, citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
The Eighth Circuit rejected the per se rule of Inland Trucking and noted:
[W]e do not think that [a per se rule] conforms with the Supreme
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Great Dane involved a union charge that the employer had discri-
minatorily withheld vacation pay from striking employees in viola-
tion of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).11 Upon reviewing its previous deci-
sions,"° the Court set forth two tests applicable to finding a violation
of § 8(a)(3):
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of impor-
tant employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is
needed . . . even if the employer introduces evidence that the
conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if
the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct. . . is "com-
paratively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to
sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evi-
dence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for
the conduct."
Court's opinions touching this issue and decide it would be improper
for us at this time to adopt a per se rule. To do so would remove the
development of the law in this area from the special competence of
the Board, which has been proceeding on a case-by-case basis. . . by
balancing the interests of employees and employers ....
486 F.2d at 840. Thus, the court was not ruling out the possibility that a bargaining
lockout and the use of temporary employees would be violative of the provisions of the
NLRA.
51388 U.S. at 30.
'0 The Court primarily relied upon Brown and American Ship. See notes 35-45 and
accompanying text supra.
"1388 U.S. at 34. The Court went on to say that "once it has been proved that the
employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected em-
ployee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was
motivated by legitimate objectives .... " Id. Thus, it appears that the employer's
conduct will not be classified as "inherently destructive" or "comparatively slight"
until the employer's justifications are presented. The Court in Great Dane found no
need to "decide the degree to which the challenged conduct might have affected em-
ployee rights . . . [since] the company came forward with no evidence of legitimate
motives . . . ... Id. However, it has been noted that the Great Dane decision did not
clearly specify when the court will categorize the employer's conduct as inherently
destructive or comparatively slight. See Janofsky, New Concepts In Interference and
Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building and Great
Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. Rv. 81, 96 (1970). As Mr. Janofsky points out, the most
desirable approach appears to be to
analyze both the effect on employee rights and the justification for the
employer's conduct at one and the same time before purporting to
characterize the employer's conduct. . . . After all . . . looking first
at the effect upon employee rights only and second to the employer's
justification, can result in a total disregard of the employer's interest.
Id. at 99. Also, if the employer's conduct was classified as inherently destructive prior
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Therefore, under Great Dane, it appears that it is incumbent upon
the employer, once it is shown that he has discriminated against the
employees, to rebut the presumption that the company has violated
§ 8(a)(3). Since the Court was primarily concerned with an alleged
§ 8(a)(3) violation, the Great Dane presumption would not seem to
be applicable to a case involving both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3. How-
ever, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Inter-Collegiate, the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.2 indicates that
the Great Dane presumption may be used to consider alleged viola-
tions of § 8(a)(1) as well as § 8(a)(3).13
It appears that the Great Dane analysis should be applied to
determine the legality of a bargaining lockout and the hiring of tem-
porary personnel."4 The Seventh Circuit in Inland Trucking alluded
to the principles set forth in Great Dane, but decided that since the
to a consideration of the business reasons for his conduct, it appears that the presump-
tion would be irrebutable since the justification can then be ignored. See text following
note 60 supra.
However, a great deal of confusion has arisen over the question of when the em-
ployer is required to come forward with evidence of substantial business justifications.
For example, the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co. & Liberty Eng. Co.,
474 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1973), held that the discharge of a substantial number of
workers during a union organizational campaign was inherently destructive of the
employees' rights. The court found that since the employer's actions were inherently
destructive, the burden was upon the company to justify its conduct. Id. at 1158. Thus,
it appears that the court classified the employer's conduct as inherently destructive
prior to determining the sufficiency of the business justifications presented by the
company. See also Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
Unlike Midwest Hanger, the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148
(6th Cir. 1972), did not categorize the denial of vacation benefits as being either
inherently destructive or comparatively slight. However, the court pointed out that the
withholding of benefits did have an adverse effect upon the employees and therefore,
it was necessary for the employer to "establish that [he] wu motivated by legitimate
objectives." Id. at 1152. It seems that the Sixth Circuit was strictly applying the Great
Dane formulation by refusing to classify the employer's conduct until the business
justifications were considered.
-389 U.S. 375 (1967).
11486 F.2d at 844. In Fleetwood Trailer, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding
in Great Dane by saying:
Under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) . . . it is an unfair labor practice to interfere
with the exercise of these rights [under § 7]. Accordingly, unless the
employer . . . can show that his action was due to "legitimate and
substantial business justifications," he is guilty of an unfair labor
practice.
399 U.S. at 378. Fleetwood Trailer involved the refusal of an employer to reinstate a
number of his striking employees. Id. at 376-77. However, the decision points out that
the Great Dane test may be used to consider violations of both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3).
"See text following note 17 supra.
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employer's actions were unquestionably in conflict with § 8(a)(1),
the lockout was "inherently destructive" of the employees' § 7 rights
and automatically came within the provisions of § 8(a)(3).11 In effect,
the court held that the use of temporary employees after a bargaining
lockout was not only a per se violation of § 8(a)(1), but, a fortiori,
violative of § 8(a)(3). In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit disregarded
two important considerations which would appear to negate a per se
finding of anti-union motivation: (1) the previous decisions of the
Supreme Court in American Ship and Brown, and (2) the fact that a
bargaining impasse had been reached between the employer and the
union prior to the lockout."
In American Ship, the Supreme Court balanced the legitimacy of
the bargaining lockout against the possible coercive effect that the
lockout would have upon the employees' rights to bargain collectively
and to strike. The Court held that:
Proper analysis of the problem demands that the simple inten-
tion to support the employer's bargaining position as to com-
pensation and the like be distinguished from a hostility to the
process of collective bargaining which could suffice to render
a lockout unlawful.
67
The Court also found that the employer's actions did not destroy the
right to strike since the NLRA does not give the union the exclusive
freedom to determine at what precise moment the strike should
occur. " ' However, since the Court expressly left open the question of
the employer's legal right to hire temporary replacements after a
bargaining lockout,6 9 the principles espoused in American Ship must
be read in connection with the Court's decision in Brown.
7 0
Upholding the use of a lockout and the hiring of temporary re-
placements, the Supreme Court in Brown stated that the "resulting
tendency to discourage union membership is comparatively remote,
'See text following note 14 supra.
"In Inter-Collegiate, the court stated that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the Com-
pany and the Union were at impasse in their negotiations by October 15th ... " 486
F.2d at 841. The Inland Trucking decision, on the other hand, does not specifically
mention whether the parties had reached an impasse. However, the Board's opinion
in Inland Trucking noted that there had been five or six negotiation sessions prior to
the lockout and that the employers refused to make any further offers. 179 N.L.R.B.
at 352. Thus, it appears that both the Board and the Seventh Circuit assumed that a
bargaining impasse had been reached.
'380 U.S. at 309.
"Id. at 310.
"See note 42 supra.
°380 U.S. 278. See text following note 35 supra.
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and that this use of temporary personnel constitutes a measure rea-
sonably adapted to the effectuation of a legitimate business end.
' 7'
The Court went on to say that the lockout and the use of temporary
employees may have had a discriminatory effect upon the union as a
bargaining agent, but that its effect was "comparatively insubstan-
tial."71 2 If, as in both Inland Trucking and Inter-Collegiate, the perma-
nent employees are assured that their positions are being filled only
until the union and the company reach an agreement, 3 the threat to
the employees' job status appears minimal. Also, as the Supreme
Court noted in Brown, "the membership, through its control of union
policy, could end the dispute and terminate the lockout at any time
simply by agreeing to the employers' terms and returning to work
... "I' Thus, it appears that the use of temporary replacements
after a bargaining lockout has no greater restrictive effect upon the
employees' or the union's rights than does the hiring of temporary
personnel following a multi-employer lockout as in Brown.7 5 It may
be argued that the Supreme Court limited its decision in Brown to a
defensive lockout. 76 However, in view of the Court's decision in
1'380 U.S. at 288.
7Id.
"The Inter-Collegiate decision specifically mentioned that the union was told by
the employer that the replacements were to be used only until a settlement was
reached. 486 F.2d at 842. Also, in Inland Trucking, the Board found that the perma-
vent employees were kept from working "for the period of the lockout." 179 N.L.R.B.
at 351.
However, this raises the question of whether the employer could lock-out his
employees and hire permanent replacements. It must be conceded that the employer
who resorts to the use of permanent help after a bargaining lockout runs the serious
risk of violating both §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). In this situation, the employees are not
allowed the privilege of choosing to participate in concerted activities at the possible
expense of their employment. Justice Goldberg noted in Brown that "[tihere would
be grave doubts as to whether the act of locking out employees and hiring permanent
replacements is justified by any legitimate interest of the nonstruck employers. .. ."
380 U.S. at 293 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It appears that the
important distinction is that in cases such as Inland Trucking and Inter-Collegiate,
the loss of employment is temporary and the effect upon the employee's job status is
comparatively slight.
11380 U.S. at 289.
"See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 284, where the Court stated:
In the circumstances of this case, we do not see how the continued
operations of [the employers] and their use of temporary replace-
ments imply hostile motivation any more than the lockout itself; nor
do we see how they are inherently more destructive of employee rights.
Brown involved a so-called "defensive" situation in which the union attempted to use
the whipsaw strike against a multi-employer association. See text following note 35
supra. However, in the absence of any proof of the employer's illegal motivation, it
appears that the logic of Brown could be extended to the case of a bargaining lockout
followed by the use of temporary replacements.
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American Ship and the fact that in both Inland Trucking and Inter-
Collegiate a bargaining impasse had been reached prior to the
lockout, the distinction between an offensive and defensive lockout
cannot be relied upon to determine the legality of the employer's
conduct.77
The term "bargaining impasse" has never been clearly defined by
the Supreme Court. In NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc.,"5 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated that an impasse is "a state of facts in
which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked."79
If an impasse has been reached, the parties are free to resort to legiti-
mate bargaining tactics to bring pressure to bear upon the other side.
The Supeme Court has noted that "the use of economic pressure by
the parties to a labor dispute. . . is part and parcel of the process of
collective bargaining."' 0 When the parties are truly deadlock, it ap-
pears that the union's most potent weapon is a strike. Since negotia-
tions have broken down, the threat of a work stoppage is imminent."'
Therefore, the employer who locks-out his permanent employees after
a bargaining impasse may well be acting defensively. The distinction
between an offensive and defensive lockout becomes illusory if the
bargaining process is no longer successful and a resort to economic
weapons is a very real possibility. 2 In this situation, the employer's
"See text accompanying note 39 supra.
'See note 66 supra.
78318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
7'Id. at 482.
"NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960). See also NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 283. The Insurance Agents decision resolved the question of
whether the union had violated § 8(b)(3) of the NLRA by instructing the employees
to engage in "on-the-job harassing tactics" while negotiations were in progress. 361
U.S. at 488. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for the union to "refuse
to bargain collectively with an employer . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970). The
Supreme Court, while upholding the union's tactics as being legitimate, noted that "if
the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used . . . it
would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms
on which the parties contract." 361 U.S. at 490.
"It has been suggested that a pre-impasse bargaining lockout may be lawful. See
Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Dalton Brick and Tile Corp., 301 F.2d
886 (5th Cir. 1962). However, the additional act of replacing the permanent employees
prior to an impasse may be strong evidence of an anti-union motivation on the part of
the employer. One writer has also suggested that this may be compared with the
unlawful unilateral imposition of bargaining terms by the employer. See Note, The
Unanswered Questions of American Ship, 64 MICH. L. REv. 910 (1966).
RIt should be noted that the Supreme Court, in American Ship, found that a
bargaining impasse had been reached prior to the lockout. 380 U.S. at 303. The Trial
Examiner's and the Board's conclusions differed over whether the employer, after
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conduct should not be held in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
simply because the lockout and the use of temporary personnel has
been defined as an offensive measure. Disregarding the offensive-
defensive distinction, if as in Inland Trucking and Inter-Collegiate a
bargaining impasse has been reached, the threat of a strike is appar-
ent and the rationale of American Ship and Brown should be applied.
A lockout combined with the hiring of replacements will have a
measurable impact upon both the union as a bargaining agent and
the employees' right to engage in concerted activities., It is arguable,
however, that the effect will be much less than that emanating from
the right of a struck employer to hire permanent replacements. Since
1938, the Supreme Court has recognized that an employer faced with
an actual strike by his employees, may hire permanent help without
violating the provisions of the NLRA. 4 Even though § 13 of the
NLRA 15 prohibits any interference with the right to strike, the Court
has found that "it does not follow that an employer, guilt of no act
denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue
his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers."8 It has been
said that the right to employ permanent replacements rests upon
dicta,87 but the Court's pronouncement has been reaffirmed in later
decisions. 88 The use of permanent replacements after a strike seems
to be a legitimate employer prerogative.
In the situation presented by Inland Trucking and Inter-
Collegiate, an analogy can be drawn between the employer's right to
hire permanent replacements during a strike and the use of tempo-
rary personnel subsequent to a bargaining lockout. The arguments
against a comparison of the two practices are premised upon the
impasse, could reasonably have anticipated a strike. Id. at 306. Conversely, the Su-
preme Court refused to base its decision on these grounds and upheld the bargaining
lockout, disregarding the offensive-defensive distinction. Id. at 308. However, since
the Court did not decide whether an employer may hire temporary replacements
following a bargaining lockout, it appears that the impasse may be an important
consideration in establishing the legality of the employer's conduct.
""While the use of temporary nonunion personnel in preference to the locked-out
union members is discriminatory, we think that any resulting tendency to discourage
union membership is comparatively remote ... " NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 288
(1965).
'"NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"Section 13 of the NLRA provides that "[niothing in this subchapter, except as
specifically provided for ... shall be construed so as ... to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
8 NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
"See Comment, 85 HARv. L. REv. 680 (1972).
"E.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965).
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theory that "the struck employer is acting defensively, whereas the
employer who locks out . . . bears the onus of casting the first
stone." ' However, when a bargaining impasse is reached, it is ques-
tionable whether "casting the first stone" is a relevant consideration
in determining the legality of the employer's actions9 0 The most im-
portant test is whether the bargaining lockout and the use of tempo-
rary personnel is "inherently destructive" of the employee's rights
under § 7 of the NLRA.9 ' By hiring temporary replacements after a
lockout and declaring that those replacements will work only until
the conflict is resolved, the company is not seriously threatening the
job status of the permanent employees. If the union agrees to the
terms offered by the company, or a compromise is reached, the em-
ployees can return to their jobs immediately.12 The use of a bargain-
ing lockout and temporary replacements appears to have no greater
adverse effect upon the employees' rights than other legitimate em-
ployer activities, and certainly has much less significance than the
well recognized right to permanently replace striking employees. 3
A finding that the use of temporary replacements is not inherently
destructive of the employees' rights will not automatically prompt a
dismissal of the charges against the company. The Supreme Court's
decision in Great Dane requires the employer to come foward with
"legitimate and substantial business justifications" for his conduct. 4
The reasons presented by the employer may negate the inference that
the company was motivated by anti-union feelings. The Eighth
Circuit in Inter-Collegiate found that the company was "engaged in
a highly seasonable business"95 and that the lockout and resort to
"Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and
Brown Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193 (1966).
"0See text following note 78 supra.
'See text following note 60 supra.
"See note 38 supra.
"3Employers have adopted various legal means to ease the impact that a strike may
have upon their business. One such method is the stock piling of inventory prior to a
work stoppage. Re-adjusting contract schedules and transferring work to another plant
may also be effective. See Comment, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1494, 1497 (1963).
However, permanent replacement of striking employees has a decided impact, not
only upon the workers job status, but also on their rights as protected under § 7 of
the NLRA. If a good faith employer is denied the ability to hire temporary replace-
ments after a bargaining lockout, it appears that perhaps the Supreme Court's ruling
in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tel. Co. should be reconsidered. See text following note
84 supra. The vitality of Mackay has remained unchallenged since 1938 and the logic
of that case seems to extend to the situation presented by the use of temporary person-
nel following a bargaining lockout. See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
"1388 U.S. at 34.
"1486 F.2d at 842. The employer prepared yearbooks and announcements which
were usually completed in time for June graduations.
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temporary replacements was prompted by a "very real possibility of
a strike."9 The court relied upon the fact that a majority of the
company's business was done between the months of February and
June,97 and that the lockout, which took place on October 16, was
used to prevent a union strike during the peak months of produc-
tion.9" It appears that by justifying the employer's actions on these
grounds, the Eighth Circuit significantly narrowed the class of
employers who would be able to lock-out their employees and hire
temporary replacements.
There is no precise definition of the phrase "legitimate and sub-
stantial business considerations." However, it appears that the na-
ture and amount of proof presented by the employer will determine
whether the employer's actions are to be classified as inherently de-
structive or merely comparatively slight.99 If the employer's conduct
is found to be inherently destructive of the employees' rights, it is
arguable whether the company can ever rebut the inference of anti-




"See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra. For example, in Allied Indus. Workers
Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the company refused to give striking
employees their vacation pay until the work stoppage had ended. The court found that
even though there was uncontroverted evidence that the company had some financial
difficulties, that evidence was insufficient to show substantial business justification.
Id. at 878. However, the court went on to say that even if the employer had given
stronger business rasons for his actions, a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) would
have been found since "the Company possessed the requisite antiunion motive to
overcome a showing of substantial business justification." Id. at 878 n.18.
Unlike Allied Indus. Workers, NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 398 F.2d 640
(5th Cir. 1968), involved an alleged discriminatory discharge of a company employee.
The Fifth Circuit found that the Company had presented sufficient business justifica-
tion by showing that the employee had caused numerous tie-ups on the production line
by working too slowly. Id. at 643. The court seemed to make a distinction between
discharge cases and other employer practices and stated that "in controversies involv-
ing employee discharges, the motive of the employer is the controlling factor .. .."
Id. at 645, quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 287. The court went on to say that
the discharge of the employee "was not categorically discriminatory as was the with-
holding of vacation benefits in Great Dane Trailers. . . ."Id. Thus, it was incumbent
upon the Board to show that the employee was fired due to the company's improper
anti-union motive. For other cases involving §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) after an employee
was discharged, see generally NLRB v. Advanced Bus. Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1973); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1968); Signal
Oil and Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968); Visador Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d
276 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 242 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957).
I"oTheoretically, it may be possible for the employer to show that his conduct did
not "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." See text accom-
1974]
790 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
overwhelmingly adverse to the interests of the employees, the use of
temporary replacements subsequent to a bargaining lockout seems to
be a justifiable economic weapon. The Eighth Circuit in Inter-
Collegiate held that a bargaining lockout and the hiring of temporary
personnel was not inherently destructive.' The seasonable nature of
the company's business was found to be a sufficient excuse for the
employer's actions.' It appears, however, that the employer should
not be required to show that he would suffer unique economic hard-
ships. A company that has a relatively stable year-round business
would not then be cut-off from using a potentially legitimate bargain-
ing technique. If the impact upon the employees is not found to be
unduly coercive, the burden of showing a substantial business justifi-
cation should not be as demanding as in cases where the employer's
actions are obviously repugnant to the employees' protected rights.113
The aim of the NLRA is to uphold and protect the procedure of
collective bargaining.' When that process breaks down, the role of
the Board and the courts is to ensure that both the union and man-
agement play by the rules of the game."5 Each side should be free to
resort to legitimate economic weapons to enhance their bargaining
power. A bargaining lockout followed by the use of temporary re-
placements does have a measurable effect upon the employees' right
to engage in or refrain from concerted activities. However, it is only
when that economic weapon is used either to infringe upon protected
employee rights or with the intent to discriminate against union
panying note 14 supra. However, in practical application, a finding that the employer's
actions are inherently destructive of the employees' rights appears to negate the possi-
bility of rebutting the presumption of anti-union motivation. Cf. Allied Indus. Workers
Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co. &
Liberty Eng. Corp., 474 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Advanced Bus. Forms
Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973); Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 128
(7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Frick Co., 397 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1968).
11486 F.2d at 845.
10'See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
11This suggestion would appear to reduce the amount and substance of proof that
the Great Dane decision requires of an employer who is charged with a violation of
§§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). However, it cannot be doubted that a prolonged strike may
have a serious effect upon any employer, whether or not he is engaged in a "highly
seasonable business." It seems that the right to hire temporary personnel after a
bargaining lockout should not be viewed from the uniqueness of the employer's situa-
tion, but rather from the effect that the lockout has upon the employees and the union.
"'1See text accompanying note 1 supra.
101,In case of a breakdown of relations between employer and organized employees,
their respective rights and remedies are governed by the common law of strikes and
picketing developed through labor injunction, by state strike-control laws or the Taft-
Hartley Act." A. Cox and D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 2 (7th ed.
1969).
